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1  ECO I  OVATIO S A D RE EWABLE E ERGY: I TRODUCTIO  
Innovation  is  a  strategically  important  element  in  domestic  and  international 
competitiveness. Due to increasing globalisation, international differences in pricing are 
becoming  more  and  more  apparent,  so  that  quality  issues  are  gaining  in  importance. 
Against this backdrop, innovation is regarded as one of the fundamental pre-conditions for 
survival among the international competition, as well as the crucial engine driving faster 
growth in the economy as a whole and in the number of well-qualified jobs. 
The various fields of policy – not least environmental policy – may promote or restrict 
innovation.  Thus  an  analysis  of  the  effects  on  innovation  of  environmental  policy 
instruments, or combinations of instruments which explicitly influence the behaviour of 
economic actors, is of especial value, although there is still great uncertainty as to the 
actual effects themselves. 
Moreover, above all in respect of the demand for technology policy to be neutral in its 
structure  and  allocating  funds,  a  certain  change  is  becoming  apparent  in  research  and 
environmental  policy,  which  also  requires  research.  Supporting  innovation  is  seen  to 
contain opportunities for better environmental protection and more sustainable, and more 
support is recommended for so-called environmental innovation or eco-innovation. The 
focus is above all on innovation which can make a contribution to the environment or 
sustainability. 
The  question  of  how  much  innovation  can  contribute  to  gaining  and  applying  new 
knowledge  for  solving  urgent  economic  and  social  problems  is  a  subject  of  more 
discussion now than ever before. Firstly, the growing interest in innovation reflects the 
concern  that  some  European  countries  might  be  falling  behind  other  advancing 
(industrialised) countries, not only in developing new solutions but also, and above all, in 
applying them, i.e. in  exploiting technological potential for products with a market, in 
introducing  modern  management, production  and  working practices  and  in  opening  up 
global markets. Only with a greater ability to innovate, coupled with competence and a 
willingness to be creative, it will be possible to give new energy to structural change in the 
economy, enable faster growth and – above all – to create new jobs. 
Secondly,  even  the  most  urgent  of  today’s  environmental  problems  cannot  be 
considered solved. In addition to the existing technological options and development paths, 
innovation which specifically addresses environmental problems will in all probability be 
required, in order to ensure long-term sustainable development. Alongside a significant 
improvement in productivity with resources (the efficiency revolution), basic innovation 
with  a  long-term  yield  should  be  stimulated,  opening  up  more  environmentally  sound 
development paths for products and technologies.  
However, research is required not only in technology, but also in understanding the 
necessary framework conditions for bringing about such environmental innovation. As far 
back as 1996, a study by Zimmermann et al. on the relationship between environmental 
taxation,  innovation  and  sustainable  development  determined  that  ”…  environmental 
charges have been grouped together, and their effects over time studied in a variety of   gws gws gws gws       Discussion Paper       2010/2 
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ways, but that there are no similar structures for innovation. Two more or less unconnected 
theories exist alongside one another. For a number of years, there has been a theory of 
innovation and technological progress within general economic theory, with virtually no 
reference to the environment. Alongside this, there is some literature on innovation for 
environmental  protection,  but  with  almost  no  reference  to  the  former  complex.” 
(Zimmermann et al., 1996). 
This contribution brings together two strands of thought: in section 2 it firstly discusses, 
coming from the innovation literature, what drives innovation and innovative behaviour in 
the economy. Secondly it looks extensively at the literature on price instruments, especially 
environmental tax reform (ETR), and its effects on innovation. From this, we will construct 
extensions to our scenarios, where some of the ETR revenues are used to foster innovation. 
The second part from sections 3 to 6 is dedicated to this modelling experience.  
The modelling exercise in this second part exceeds the scope of the literature review, 
because  it  dwells  into  the  overall  effects  of  a  European  ETR  compared  to  a  baseline 
development before  it  actually  looks  into  scenarios  designed  to  explicitly  support  eco-
innovation, or renewable energy sources (RES) technologies as such. Simulations build on 
the  Anglo-German  Foundation  (AGF) petrE  (Resource  Productivity  and  Environmental 
Tax Reform in Europe) project (Ekins & Speck, 2010). In one of the scenarios 10% of the 
ETR  revenues  are  earmarked  to  support  investment  in  renewable  energy  and  energy 
efficiency to enhance innovation. In further scenarios additional EU exports due to RES 
investment in other parts of the world and changes in the EU industry structure due to a 
shift  towards  RES  in  the  electricity  sector  are  explicitly  modelled.  With  the  current 
enormous increase in RES installation in China and the plans of the Obama administration, 
these  assumptions  seem  to  be  more  realistic  than  the  quite  pessimistic  international 
perspective in the underlying baseline development, which is based on DGTREN (2008) 
and IEA (2008). The new IEA (2009) WEO will mirror these new perceptions. 
2  ECO I  OVATIO  I  THE LITERATURE 
2.1  DRIVERS OF I  OVATIO  
To capture the multi-faceted structure of an innovation system one should work from a 
rather  wide  definition.  Innovation  then  can  mean  all  artefacts,  processes,  ideas  and 
strategies that successfully change routines and are implemented in specific contexts of 
use, which can be changed in turn through the innovation. This definition is wider than 
some to be found in the literature in the sense that it not only comprises the invention of a 
new process or technology but also its diffusion. Therefore, the analysis transcends the 
analysis  of  patent  data  or  the  introduction  of  a  new  technology,  but  takes  the  whole 
innovation  system  with  its  intrinsic  feed-back  loops  into  consideration.  The  relations 
between actors, their co-operation and spill-overs play an important role (see e.g. Carlsson 
& Stankiewicz 1991, Edquist 2001, Lundvall et al. 2001 and Malerba 2006). The process 
of innovation is not understood as a linear sequence but rather as a non-linear, highly 
interactive process as proposed by Kline & Rosenberg (1986) or Rothwell (1995). Hence, 
we are confronted with a situation where both technology push as well as market pull   gws gws gws gws       Discussion Paper       2010/2 
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factors influence the generation and diffusion of innovations (Mowery & Rosenberg 1979, 
Pavitt 1984).  
The importance of innovations for social change, international competition, structural 
change  and  economic  growth  has  been  analysed  quite  successfully  in  the  last  decade. 
However, how and why innovation comes about and what triggers it or slows it down is 
still an open question. There is evidence, that knowledge is the most important input in the 
process of innovation; the importance of knowledge in certain innovative industries has 
been  empirically  shown  (Dosi,  1988,  Hullmann,  2001).  Sparks  of  innovation  emerge 
through the interplay of different forms of heterogeneous knowledge: their confrontation, 
combination,  fusion,  transformation.  Different  schools  of  thought  describe  the 
accumulation and the distribution of knowledge within the firm, in the economic sector and 
in innovation system differently. 
From  an  individualistic  perspective  the  analysis  focuses  on  the  entrepreneur,  who 
decides about access to knowledge in the firm (Hauschildt, 2004). Evolutionary economics 
takes a more comprehensive approach and sees the firm as knowledge storage and as part 
of  a  wider  organizational  system  (Fagerberg  et  al.,  2005).  Additionally,  the  different 
knowledge generating processes at the level of the firm like learning by searching, learning 
by doing or learning by interacting and their respective impact on innovation processes are 
taken  into  consideration  (Malerba,  1992).  With  regard  to  renewable  energies  there  are 
however  just  a  few  studies  which  analyse  the  influence  of  these  different  learning 
mechanisms (see e. g. Miketa & Schrattenholzer, 2004) as most analyses are based on the 
well-known single learning curve approach.  
Even though some authors, for instance in the framework of the Innovation Systems 
Approach  (Carlsson &  Stankiewicz, 1991,  Lundvall et al., 2001, Malerba  & Orsenigo, 
1997) place a certain emphasis on the importance of both technology push and demand 
pull factors it has to be stated that up to now ‘demand related aspects still play a minor in 
the  innovation  literature’  (Edler  et  al.,  2006).  But  given  the  fact  that  the  potential  of 
demand-oriented  policy  measures  is  increasingly  recognized  analyses  of  customer 
behaviour  gain  more  and  more  importance.  Especially,  the  modelling  of  the  various 
interdependencies between firms’ dynamics, demand dynamics and technology dynamics 
is considered to be a challenging but crucial task (Malerba, 2005). 
Considering  the  Innovation  Systems  approach  it  has moreover been  argued  that  the 
approach  lacked  micro-foundations  and  would  not  reflect  the  path  dependence  of 
innovation  formation  due  to  habit,  norms  and  institutions  (see  e.g.  Rammert,  2002). 
Rammert argues further that innovation systems currently are undergoing a transition from 
sequentially organized systems to fractionally structured networks. Though such a system 
is different for each innovation – a thought that is reflected in the term “biography” of an 
innovation – Rammert, together with Hage & Hollingsworth (2000) or Amin & Cohendet 
(2004)  assumes  that  the  number  of  actors  from  different  backgrounds  enhance  the 
likelihood of strong innovation activities and their success in the system. However, the 
more the analysis focuses on the individual biographies, the less the approach becomes 
suitable for more general recommendations and results.  
The lack of knowledge on the drivers of innovations is even more prominent when it 
comes  to  studying  eco-innovations.  The  latest  OECD  publication  on  eco-innovation   gws gws gws gws       Discussion Paper       2010/2 
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(OECD 2009) states that “Government policy initiatives and programmes that promote 
eco-innovation are diverse and include both supply-side and demand-side measures.” As 
most countries recognize the need for a more collaborative approach to innovation, many 
initiatives  involve  creating  networks,  platforms  or  partnerships  that  engage  different 
industry and non-industry stakeholders. Demand-side measures are receiving increasing 
attention, as governments acknowledge that insufficiently developed markets are often the 
key  constraint  for  eco-innovation.  (…)  A  more  comprehensive  understanding  of  the 
interaction  between  supply  and  demand  for  eco-innovation  will  be  a  pre-requisite  for 
creating successful eco-innovation policies.” 
The  literature  body  is  larger  when  it  comes  to  single  technologies.  Among  eco-
innovations, much research has been done on technologies for the use of renewable energy 
sources.  Since  European  energy  markets  currently  undergo  significant  changes  from 
centralized monopolistic markets to a more competitive environment with a lot of different 
participants and the challenges from climate change and environmental issues have to be 
met. Apart from environmental goals, the support policies aim at economic development 
and technological change. The German feed-in law, for instance, has already triggered the 
rapid development in the German wind industry and in the photovoltaic industry. But it is 
widely agreed that still a lot of innovation is needed for technologies to provide clean 
electricity at affordable cost at a large scale for the future.  
Success factors in these innovation systems hinge on a wide array of determinants. They 
differ depending on the innovation phase, the technology and the actors, institutions and 
participants in the innovation system. For instance, the technological system for solar cells 
exhibits some very interesting characteristics (Roloff et al., 2008): Firstly, the technology 
as such has been known for more than 100 years by now (Green, 2000). However, the 
technological development was dominated by ‘science-based  experimentation’ until the 
1990s.  Solar  cells  were  first  used  for  extraterrestrial  applications  during  the  so  called 
‘Space Age’ (1958 to 1973). Later on they were also used for consumer electronic products 
as well as for off-grid power systems (1974 until mid-1990s). Nevertheless public policy 
measures  still  had  a  strong  focus  on  the  support  of  R&D  activities.  Until  Japan  and 
Germany  started  their  first  demand-oriented  programs  during  the  1990s  the  role  of 
photovoltaics  with  regard  to  the  supply  of  energy  thus  remained  quite  limited.  These 
initiatives and successive programmes and regulative changes eventually led towards a 
significant  growth  of  the  PV-industry  and  therefore  to  an  expansion  of  the  whole 
technological system (Jacobsson et al., 2002). As the technology evolved, the motifs of 
actors changed and new actors have been attracted to the field.  
Other case studies show similar effects, for instance on wind energy supported by tax 
breaks in Texas (Langniss, 2003), introduction of wind energy in Denmark supported by 
R&D support and demand oriented instruments as the most important instrument, or the 
German example with successful diffusion of innovative production technologies due to 
demand support mechanisms and low interest rates on credits for wind mills.  
The  Japanese  and  the  German  experience  with  solar  modules  seem  to  support  the 
hypothesis  that  R&D  support,  followed  by  demand  side  mechanisms  and  a  strong 
regulatory  framework  promote  innovations.  The  guaranteed  market  created  by  demand 
side instruments helps diffusion of innovative products and the invention by innovative   gws gws gws gws       Discussion Paper       2010/2 
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firms as well. R&D support and tax breaks, however, have proved to be successful as well, 
as long as the system is transparent and continuous.  
However,  these  studies  focused  on  success  or  failure  case  studies  of  specific  eco-
innovations such as wind mills or solar panels. To get a complete picture, we carried out a 
literature view on the reversed question: given a certain instrument, what type and phase of 
eco-innovations  benefits  or  looses?  Since  our  study  focuses  on  an  Environmental  Tax 
Reform, the more important answers will come from the body of literature on ETR and 
eco-innovation. 
One cautionary remark in advance: Though innovation is seemingly triggered by the 
mere existence of ETR, i.e. by the respective price changes, the innovative efforts will be 
distributed over all energy applications. Specific funds allocation seems to be necessary if 
the innovative potential has to be guided towards certain applications such as renewable 
energy technologies of certain efficiency technologies.   
2.2  E VIRO ME TAL TAX REFORM A D ECO I  OVATIO  
1 
2.2.1  INTRODUCTION 
A two-step methodology has been employed for the literature review. In the first step, 
potential references were identified and screened in order to determine their relevance to 
the topic and to classify them along four relevant dimensions. In the second step, those 
references that were identified as being of significant relevance were reviewed in detail in 
order to distill the key conclusions regarding the potential implications of environmental 
tax reform for eco-innovation. 
There  is  a  relatively  large  (and  growing)  literature  on  the  relationship  between 
environmental policy  interventions  and  technological  innovation  – both  theoretical  and 
empirical. While this covers a wide range of policy instruments (i.e. command and control 
regulations, environmental taxes, permit trading schemes and voluntary agreements), only 
one of the identified references considers explicitly the impacts of an environmental tax 
reform (ETR) programme. Consequently, this review has focused on those studies that 
have assessed the impacts of environmental taxes (and in some cases, factor prices) on 
innovation.  However,  in  order  to  provide  some  context,  the  impacts  of  environmental 
regulation more generally are also considered.  
Before proceeding, it is worth clarifying what is meant by innovation (in general) and 
by  eco-innovation  (in  particular).  Following  Schumpeter  (1942),  the  process  of 
technological change is typically broken down into the following three stages:
2 
                                                 
 
 
1   This section has been prepared by Roger Salmons, Policy Studies Institute 
 
2   Some authors break down the innovation stage into two: the application of inventions in demonstration 
projects; the development of niche applications and markets (e.g. Christiansen & Skjaerseth, 2005).   gws gws gws gws       Discussion Paper       2010/2 
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￿  invention – i.e. the first development of a scientifically or technically new product or 
process; 
￿  innovation – i.e. the commercialization of the new product or process; 
￿  diffusion – i.e. the adoption of the product or process by firms and individuals. 
The first two stages are closely related, although not all inventions will make it through 
to commercialization. They typically both occur in private companies in a process that can 
be broadly termed research and development (R&D).  
When considering the impacts of environmental policy interventions it is important to 
be  clear  which  stage  of  the  technological  development  process  one  is  considering  as 
different instruments may be more, or less, effective for different stages. Many of the 
studies explicitly identify the technological development stage to which they relate. For 
those that do not, it is sometimes possible to infer the stage from the context and / or 
characteristics of the study (e.g. the measure of innovation that is used). However, some 
studies refer only to “investment in technology” and it is not clear whether this means 
investing in the development of new products and / or production processes (i.e. invention 
and  innovation)  or  purchasing  new  plant  and  equipment  from  other  companies  (i.e. 
diffusion). 
The term “eco-innovation” is taken to mean technological development that generates 
products, equipment or production processes that reduce environmental risk or minimize 
pollution  and  resource  use.  As  such,  the  term  encompasses  all  three  stages  of  the 
technological development process – i.e. invention, innovation and diffusion.   
There  are  a  range  of  different  indicators  that  can  be  used  to  measure  innovation. 
Essentially  these  indicators  fall  into  three  groups:  those  that  measure  the  inputs  (or 
resources)  devoted  to  the  innovation  process;  those  that  measure  the  outputs  from  the 
process; and those that focus on the economic impacts of the innovations that are generated 
(Johnstone et al., 2008). 
The most common input indicator is R&D expenditure. However, there are a number of 
problems  with  this.  While  public  sector  R&D  expenditure  data  is  generally  available, 
private sector expenditure data is incomplete and usually only available at the aggregate 
level,  making  it  difficult  (or  impossible)  to  identify  environmentally-related  R&D 
expenditure. Furthermore, given the inherent uncertainty of the innovation process, the link 
between effort and resultant outputs is often very weak. Consequently, output indicators 
such  as  patent  applications  are  likely  to  provide  a  better  vehicle  for  measuring  eco-
innovation.  Patent  application  data  provides  a  reasonably  comprehensive  picture  of 
innovative  outputs
3;  is based  on  objective  standards  that  change  slowly;  and  is  readily 
available. The main advantage however is the fact that patent applications are classified 
into  detailed  technologies  (using  the  International  Patent  Classification  (IPC)  system 
developed by the World Intellectual Property Organisation). This allows the identification 
                                                 
 
 
3   While a patent may prevent rival firms from utilizing an innovation (without paying royalties), it has the 
disadvantage of putting it into the public domain.  In some cases, firms may prefer to keep the innovation 
secret rather than apply for patent protection.    gws gws gws gws       Discussion Paper       2010/2 
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of environmentally-related patents; broken down between different application areas – e.g. 
climate change, air pollution, water pollutions, waste management, etc. Impact indicators 
(also  termed  progress  indicators)  are  more  relevant  to  the  diffusion  stage  and  include 
increases in market penetration of particular eco-technologies and reductions in (marginal) 
abatement costs.
4 However, it should be noted that cost reductions can be driven by a range 
of factors and may not necessarily imply that that innovation has occurred.   
2.2.2  INITIAL SCREENING 
Potential  references  were  identified  based  on  a  review  of  journal  citations,  internet 
searches  using  keywords  and  recommendations  from  within  the  project  team.  The 
references fall into three broad groups: 
￿  refereed journal articles; 
￿  books and book chapters; 
￿  reports by consultants and experts  
In total, thirty-seven potential references were identified; the majority (twenty-eight) 
being refereed journal articles. The references were then classified along four dimensions: 
type of study; policy instrument(s) covered; policy area; technological development stage. 
On  the  basis  of  this  classification,  each  reference  was  then  assessed  in  terms  of  its 
relevance. 
A distinction is made between five different types of study. Theoretical studies use 
mathematical models to assess the impacts of  “idealized” policy instruments on firms’ 
innovative behaviour under alternative assumptions about market structure and different 
parameter values. In most cases, the studies consider several alternative instruments and 
are interested in the relative ranking of the instruments, either in terms of the amount of 
innovation that they induce, or in terms impacts of the resultant levels of social welfare. 
Empirical  studies  use  a  range  of  statistical  and  econometric  techniques  to  analyse 
quantitative  performance  data  in  order  to  assess  the  impacts  of  “actual”  policy 
interventions. Given the relative scarcity of environmental taxes in the past, there are few 
explicit studies of this instrument. However, a number of studies consider the impacts of 
changes  in  energy  prices,  which  give  an  indirect  indication  of  the  potential  impact  of 
taxation. Reviews summarize and / or compare  the findings of previous studies (either 
theoretical or empirical) and may synthesize these to draw wider conclusions. Case studies 
provide descriptive assessments of actual experiences, often comparing across countries; 
while qualitative studies consider some of the issues that can affect the performance of a 
particular policy instrument in practice. Together, these last two types of study can provide 
valuable  insights  on  the  practical  and  “political  economy”  aspects  of  instrument 
performance, to supplement the theoretical and empirical analyses. 
                                                 
 
 
4   More correctly, shifts in the abatement cost curves should be used – i.e. a reduction in cost for a fixed 
level of abatement.  Reductions due to movements along the cost curve (i.e. due to changes in the level of 
abatement) do not provide an indicator of innovation.    gws gws gws gws       Discussion Paper       2010/2 
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The second classification dimension concerns the policy instruments that are addressed 
by the study, with a distinction being made between five specific instrument types. The 
first three are market-based, or price-based, instruments: environmental taxes and charges, 
tradable  permits  and  investment  subsidies  and  tax  allowances;  all  of  which  act  by 
changing the prices of input factors in one way or another. As has been noted above, some 
studies consider the impact of energy prices rather than energy taxes per se. However, 
since the findings of these studies are directly transferable, they are classified under the tax 
heading. The fourth instrument type is voluntary / negotiated agreements, under which 
firms or sectors enter into agreements with government to achieve certain performance 
targets or undertake specific actions. The fifth type is command and control regulations, 
which encompasses technology mandates, emission limits and performance standards (e.g. 
for specific energy consumption). The final classification – regulation – is used for studies 
that consider the weight or stringency of environmental regulation in general, rather than 
any specific policy instrument. 
With regard to the policy area(s) covered by the studies, a distinction is made between 
energy and climate change, air pollution, water pollution and other policy areas. Again, 
there is a final classification – general – which is used for studies that consider the impacts 
of environmental regulation in general rather than any specific intervention, or where the 
policy area is not specified (e.g. in theoretical analyses). 
The final classification dimension concerns the stage of the technological development 
process that is addressed by the study. As has been noted above, the process is typically 
divided in to three stages: invention, innovation and diffusion. However, in practice the 
studies do not distinguish between the first two stages (often just referring generically to 
R&D) and hence they have been combined for the purposes of the classification, so that the 
only distinction is between the innovation and diffusion stages.   
Based on the results of the classification exercise, each of the studies is scored in terms 
of its relevance to the object of the review – i.e. the impact of ETR on eco-innovation. A 
three tier qualitative scoring system is used; with one star (*) indicating that the study is of 
only minor relevance, two stars (**) indicating that it is of moderate relevance, and three 
stars (***) that it is of significant relevance. Such a scoring system is inevitably subjective, 
but it provides a pragmatic mechanism for identifying the key references to be included in 
the detailed review. In determining the scores, particular emphasis was placed on whether 
the study is empirical in nature and whether it considers environmental taxes (or factor 
prices). 
Annex  1  shows  the  classifications  of  the  twenty-eight  journal  articles  that  were 
identified. Thirteen are empirical, seven are theoretical, three are case studies and four are 
qualitative, while four provide reviews of previous work in the area (including most of the 
identified studies).
5 Around two-thirds of the papers consider the impact of environmental 
taxes  (or  energy  prices),  often  comparing  these  with  the  impacts  of  other  policy 
instruments; while eleven consider the impact of investment subsidies. While most of the 
                                                 
 
 
5   Some studies are classified under  more than one heading. For example, a study  may contain both a 
theoretical model of behaviour and an empirical assessment of the model.   gws gws gws gws       Discussion Paper       2010/2 
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theoretical  analyses  are  not  area-specific  (talking  only  about  environmental  damage  in 
general terms); the empirical studies are spread fairly evenly across policy areas, with five 
each in energy / climate change and air pollution and three in water pollution. In terms of 
stage of the technological development process, there is an even split between innovation 
and  diffusion,  with  many  of  the  papers  covering  both  stages.  In  total,  eighteen  of  the 
references are included in the detailed review. 
Annexes 2 and 3 show respectively the classifications of the five book chapters and four 
reports.
6 As one might expect, there is less emphasis on theory, with only one reference 
including  any  formal  analysis.  The  other  references  are  split  fairly  evenly  between 
empirical studies, reviews and qualitative assessments. All but one consider the impact of 
environmental  taxes  or  energy  prices,  while  seven  consider  the  impact  of  investment 
subsidies. As with the journal articles, there is a fairly even spread across policy areas and 
between  innovation  and  diffusion.  Five  of  the  references  are  included  in  the  detailed 
review. 
2.2.3  DETAILED REVIEW 
The detailed review focuses on the impacts on eco-innovation of the two “price-based” 
policy  instruments  that  are  directly  relevant  to  ETR:  environmental  taxes;  investment 
subsidies and tax incentives (e.g. R&D and capital allowances).
7 A priori, each instrument 
might be expected to stimulate innovation; the first by increasing the benefits of innovation 
(i.e. by reducing tax payments); the second by reducing the costs of developing and / or 
adopting new technologies. However, in order to provide a broader context for the impacts 
of these two instruments, the review starts by considering the relationship between the 
stringency of environmental regulation in general and innovation. 
As  can  be  seen  from  the  initial  screening  (see  Annexes  1-3),  the  large  majority  of 
studies consider more than one policy instrument within a unified analytical framework – 
either  comparing  their  relative  impacts,  or  assessing  the  impacts  of  instrument 
combinations (or packages). In particular, all but one of the papers that assess the impacts 
of  investment  subsidies,  either  theoretically  or  empirically,  also  assess  the  impacts 
environmental  taxes  (and  sometimes  other  policy  instruments).  Consequently,  for  the 
purposes of this review, it is convenient to consider the impacts of taxes and subsidies at 
the same time, rather than sequentially. In addition to avoiding the need for any repetition 
(about model structures, assumptions, etc.), this facilitates the identification of potential 
interactions and synergies between the two instruments. 
                                                 
 
 
6   Two of the reports emanate from the study by Ecologic and DIW of the ETR in Germany. Details of the 
assessment of the impact on innovation and market diffusion are provided (in German) in Görlach et al. 
(2005); with a summary being provided (in English) in Knigge & Görlach (2005). 
7   While the (large) majority of revenues raised under an ETR are likely to be used to reduce taxes on 
labour,  a  small  proportion  may  be  used  to  encourage  innovation  and  /  or  promote  the  take-up  of 
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Apart from the initial sub-section on the impact of environmental regulation in general, 
only  those  references  identified  as  being  of  significant  relevance  (***)  in  the  initial 
screening are included in the review. References are summarised in chronological order 
under three headings: theoretical predictions (section 2.2.5); empirical evidence (section 
2.2.6); and case studies (section 2.2.7). At the end of each section, an attempt is made to 
synthesize the findings of the references. However, due to the tight budgetary constraints 
for the review, it has not been possible to undertake any critical analyses of the studies to 
identify their respective strengths and weaknesses, or to resolve any apparent conflicts 
between their respective findings. 
2.2.4  ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
Lanjouw & Mody (1996) use aggregate pollution and control expenditure (PACE) data 
as a proxy for the stringency of environmental regulation and compare this with data on the 
aggregate number of environmental patent applications for Germany, Japan and the USA. 
They do not perform any formal statistical / econometric analysis of the data. However, 
based on simple graphical analysis, they identify  a relatively clear correlation between 
expenditure and patents over the 1970s and 1980s, with a time lag of 1-2 years. They also 
find some indications in the data that patenting in a country also responds to increasing 
stringency of environmental regulation in the other two.  In  addition, they  consider the 
diffusion of environmental technologies by looking at trade flows in capital goods used for 
pollution  reduction;  finding  that  these  too  show  a  correlation  with  total  abatement 
expenditure.   
Jaffe  &  Palmer  (1997)  also  use  PACE  data  as  a  proxy  for  the  stringency  of 
environmental regulation and evaluate the impact of this on two different measures of 
innovation  –  total  private  expenditures  on  R&D  and  the  number  of  successful  patent 
applications by US manufacturing industries. Unlike the previous study, they undertake 
formal econometric analysis of the data, using panel data at the two-digit and three-digit 
SIC code industry level for the period 1978-1991 and a fixed effects model. They find a 
statistically  significant  positive  relationship  between  compliance  expenditures  (capital 
expenditures only) and R&D expenditures after controlling for industry-specific effects.
8 
However, they can find no significant impact on patenting activity. This is not entirely 
surprising given the fact that their data is for all types of patents, not just those relating to 
environmental technologies and products. Indeed, given that the same is true for the R&D 
expenditure  data,  it  may  be  more  surprising  that  they  find  a  significant  relationship 
between pollution compliance and R&D.   
Brunnermeier  & Cohen (2003) also use a panel data model to assess the impact of 
pollution abatement expenditures on patenting activity by US manufacturing industries. 
However, unlike the previous study, they use only environmental patent applications in 
                                                 
 
 
8   When they allow the slopes of the PACE variable to vary across industries (in addition to the intercept), 
they find considerable variation in the estimated coefficients across industries – with a number being 
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their  analysis.  They  also  control  for  other  potential  explanatory  factors,  such  as  the 
stringency of monitoring and enforcement (as measured by number of inspection visits); 
industry size (value of shipments); market structure (four-firm concentration ratio); capital 
intensity;  and  exposure  to  overseas  competition  (export  intensity).  They  estimate  four 
different  models  for  the  period  1983-92;  with  their  preferred  model  being  a  negative 
binomial  random  effects  model.  The  coefficient  for  PACE  is  positive  and  statistically 
significant (in all four models), as are the coefficients (in the preferred model) for industry 
size, concentration and export intensity. However, the magnitude of the coefficient (which 
represents  the  semi-elasticity  of  patents  with  respect  to  PACE)  is  only  0.0004.  Thus, 
ceteris paribus, an increase in abatement expenditure of $100 million results in an increase 
in the mean number of patents of only 4%. 
All  three  studies  use  PACE  data  as  a  proxy  for  the  stringency  of  environmental 
regulation.
9 While there are obvious pragmatic reasons for doing this (i.e. availability of 
data), the validity of the approach may be open to question. As Brunnermeier & Cohen 
(2003) note, expenditure may be affected by factors other than environmental regulation, 
such as external pressures from interest groups, or a desire to promote / maintain “green 
credentials” with customers. Furthermore, the reported data may not cover all pollution 
abatement costs and activities (particularly process related activities) and may be prone to 
over-statement by reporting firms for strategic reasons. However, to the extent that the 
reported  PACE  data  is  correlated  with  the  stringency  of  environmental  regulation,  the 
analyses suggest that the latter does have an impact on innovation (at least in the USA), 
although the scale of the impact appears to be small. 
2.2.5   THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS 
Although  there  had  been  a  number  of  previous  analyses  of  the  impact  of  different 
environmental  policy  instruments  on  technological  change,  Milliman  &  Prince  (1989) 
were  the  first  to  consider  the  entire  process  of  technological  change,  encompassing 
innovation, diffusion and optimal agency response.
10 Using a relatively simple graphical 
analysis of shifting marginal abatement cost curves, they deduce a relative ranking of five 
instruments  (direct  controls,  auctioned  permits,  freely  allocated  permits,  emission 
reduction  subsidies
11  and  emission  taxes)  in  terms  of  firms’  incentives  to  promote 
technological change. They conclude that emission taxes provide greater incentives for 
innovation and diffusion than direct controls or freely allocated tradable permits, although 
                                                 
 
 
9   However, the studies do not all use the same definition of PACE.  Lanjouw & Mody (1996) include (real) 
investment expenditures, regulation and monitoring costs, and research and development by all levels of 
government, and by private manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms.  The other two studies both use 
compliance cost data for private manufacturing firms (at the industry level) only.  However, while Jaffe & 
Palmer (1997) use capital cost data in their analysis, Brunnermeier & Cohen (2003) use operating cost 
data. 
10   Milliman & Prince (1989) identify a number of studies going back to 1970. 
11   These are payments for emission reductions – not technology subsidies for environmental investments.   gws gws gws gws       Discussion Paper       2010/2 
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not as great as auctioned permits. However, optimal agency response is likely to face less 
opposition  (and  in  some  cases  actually  be  favoured)  under  emission  taxes  than  under 
auctioned permits.
12      
Jaffe & Stavins (1995) develop a theoretical framework for comparing empirically the 
impacts of alternative policy instruments on the diffusion of a new technology.
13 They 
model the investment decision for both an existing firm and a new entrant; in each case 
assuming  that  the  firm  minimizes  the  present  value  of  its  cost  streams  over  time  – 
comprising operating costs, investment cost (net of any government subsidy), emission 
taxes and the implicit costs of violating either a performance or technology standard (if 
applicable). For an existing firm, the problem is to choose the optimal timing of the retrofit 
and  the  authors  show  that  the  new  technology  will  be  adopted  at  a  particular  time  if 
operating cost savings plus savings from reduced emission tax payments (plus any avoided 
penalties for not adopting a technology standard or exceeding a performance standard) in 
that period are greater than the net investment costs less the time rate of change of net 
investment costs. For a new entrant, the problem is to choose whether to use the new 
technology  at start-up.  A necessary condition for doing so is that the present value of 
operating costs savings and reduced tax payments (plus any avoided penalties) over the 
entire  time  horizon  is  greater  than  the  net  investment  cost.  Thus,  while  the  conditions 
differ, in each case the introduction of either an emissions tax or an investment subsidy (or 
increases in the respective values) changes the benefit-cost balance in favour of the new 
technology; bringing forward its adoption by existing firms and increasing the likelihood 
of adoption by new entrants. 
Kemp (1997) compares the abatement R&D expenditure levels of an individual firm 
under  direct  regulation  (i.e.  an  emissions  limit),  an  equivalent  emission  tax
14,  freely-
allocated tradable permits, using a cost minimization analytical framework and a specific 
functional form for the abatement cost function. He shows that both the level of R&D 
expenditure  and  the  level  of  emissions  reduction  increase  as  the  emissions  tax  rate 
increases  and  that  both  are  greater  under  the  tax  than  under  direct  regulation.  The 
corresponding levels under the tradable permit regime will be greater / lesser than under 
the emissions tax depending on whether the (exogenous) permit price is higher / lower than 
the tax rate. He also considers the impact of subsidizing the cost of the firm’s R&D effort 
and shows that increasing the subsidy rate causes a rise in pollution-control R&D. More 
interestingly, the impact of the subsidy is greater if it is combined with an emissions tax 
than with an equivalent emissions limit.    
Fischer et al. (2003) develop the approach used by (Milliman & Prince (MP), 1989), 
although their analysis differs in that it does not include the final agency response stage 
                                                 
 
 
12   For an emissions tax, the downward shift of the industry marginal abatement cost curve as a result of 
diffusion causes the agency to reduce the tax rate, assuming that marginal damages are increasing in 
emissions.  For permits (auctioned or freely allocated) it causes the agency to reduce the number of 
permits. 
13   The empirical application of this framework is summarised below under empirical evidence. 
14   That is, the emissions tax is set equal to the firm’s marginal cost of abatement under the direct regulation.   gws gws gws gws       Discussion Paper       2010/2 
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and the diffusion of the technology is determined by market forces with an equilibrium 
royalty price.
15 They compare an emissions tax with auctioned and freely-allocated permits 
using a three-stage model of innovation, diffusion and emissions abatement. In the first 
stage, the innovating firm decides how much to invest in R&D to develop an emissions 
abatement  technology.  In  the  second  stage,  other  firms  decide  whether  to  adopt  this 
technology  in  return  for  a  royalty  fee,  or  whether  to  use  an  (imperfect)  imitation 
technology. In the final stage, all firms choose their level of abatement to minimize costs 
given an emissions-tax or permit price. They show that the level of innovation (i.e. the 
level of R&D chosen by the innovating firm) is determined by equating the marginal cost 
of innovation with the marginal (private) benefit; where the latter has four components: an 
abatement cost effect; an emissions payment effect; an imitation effect; an adoption price 
affect;  where  the  last  two  components  are  negative
16  Using  this  model,  the  authors 
demonstrate  that  freely-allocated  permits  provide  the  lowest  incentive  for  innovation. 
However, in contrast to MP, they conclude that the relative ranking of the emissions-tax 
and  auctioned  permits  is  ambiguous  –  depending  crucially  on  the  extent  to  which  the 
technology can be imitated and hence, the extent to which the innovator can appropriate 
the gains accruing to the other firms in the form of royalty payments. If imitation is high 
(easy), then auctioned permits provide the greater incentive for innovation. However, if 
imitation is low (difficult), then the emissions-tax provides the greatest incentive.      
Montero (2002) assesses the impacts of alternative policy instruments on environmental 
innovation (as measured by R&D expenditure) under conditions of imperfect competition. 
In his model, two firms compete in either quantities (i.e. Cournot duopoly) or prices (i.e. 
Bertrand duopoly), while being subject to some form of environmental regulation. Where 
the regulation takes the form of tradable permits – either auctioned or freely-allocated – the 
market is also assumed to be imperfect, the firms competing in permit quantities. The 
interaction between the two firms is modeled as a multi-stage game, with the number of 
stages depending on the instrument being analysed. In this framework, a firm’s incentive to 
invest  in  R&D  comprises  two  components:  a  direct  or  cost  minimizing  effect  and  a 
strategic effect, reflecting the impact of its R&D expenditure on the other firm’s output 
decision.  The  latter  may  be  positive  or  negative  depending  on  the  market-regulatory 
structure.  Under  Bertrand  competition  (i.e.  where  products  are  strategic  complements), 
freely-allocated  permits  provide  the  lowest  incentive  for  innovation,  followed  by  the 
emission-standard; while the relative ranking of an emissions-tax and auctioned permits is 
ambiguous, depending on model parameter values. Under Cournot competition (i.e. where 
products  are  strategic  substitutes),  the  relative  ranking  of  the  emissions-tax,  auctioned 
permits and the emissions-standard are ambiguous, although all provide a greater incentive 
than freely-allocated permits. Indeed, the author provides a numerical example where the 
emissions-standard provides the greatest incentive for innovation. Finally, he considers the 
                                                 
 
 
15   In addition to assessing the impacts on the demand for innovation, Fischer et al (2003) consider the 
impacts of the innovation / diffusion process on social welfare in order to compare the overall economic 
efficiency of the different instruments.  
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impact of increasing competition (by increasing the number of firms) and concludes that 
under perfect competition, the emissions-tax provides the greatest incentive for innovation. 
Millock &  auges (2006) use a simple profit optimization model to analyse a firm’s 
choice  of  abatement  effort  to  reduce  emissions per unit  of  energy  used  in production. 
While they do not explicitly identify it as such, this effort can be interpreted in terms of 
diffusion of an existing technology – with higher effort corresponding to greater diffusion. 
This is consistent with the overall objective of their study, which is to assess the impact of 
combining an emissions-tax with a subsidy on (existing) abatement equipment.
17 In their 
model, the firm simultaneously chooses the levels of its energy input and abatement effort, 
given exogenous output and energy prices, and a cost function for abatement effort.
18  They 
show  that  while  increases  in  the  subsidy  rate  (expressed  as  a  percentage  of  the  gross 
investment cost) unambiguously increases abatement effort, the impact of increases in the 
tax rate depends on whether the direct impact of tax increase on the marginal benefit of 
abatement  effort  (i.e.  shifting  it  up)  outweighs  the  indirect  impact  via  the  resultant 
reduction in output (i.e. shifting it down). If the latter dominates, then increases in the tax 
rate will reduce the optimal level of abatement effort. The authors show that a necessary 
and sufficient condition for the direct impact to dominate is that the slope of the firm’s 
(inverse) demand for energy is greater than the average emissions-tax payment per unit of 
energy in relation to total energy use.
19 
McGinty & de Vries (2009) analyse the relationship between environmental subsidies, 
the  diffusion  of  a  clean  technology,  and  the  degree  of  product  differentiation  in  an 
imperfectly competitive output market. In their model, a fixed number of firms can choose 
individually between using a “clean” production technology and a “dirty” technology. Both 
technologies exhibit constant marginal production costs and constant emission rates (with 
the clean technology having a lower emission rate and higher unit cost) and consumers are 
assumed to be able to differentiate between products on the basis of the technology used in 
their production.
20 The subsidy regime is different to that considered by the other studies, 
in that it is applied to the production cost of the clean good – i.e. it reduces the (constant) 
marginal cost of production for that good. As such, it is equivalent to an output subsidy for 
the clean good. The authors derive the equilibrium diffusion rate for the clean technology 
(i.e. the proportion of firms using that technology) and show that an increase in the subsidy 
                                                 
 
 
17   In the second half of their paper, Millock &  auges (2006) undertake an empirical evaluation of such a 
scheme that operated in France during the 1990s for SO2 and NOX emissions.  The results of this analysis 
are summarised under empirical evidence.  
18   Abatement effort is assumed to exhibit decreasing returns to scale – i.e. the cost function is increasing and 
convex. 
19   If  output  is  held  fixed  in  the  profit  maximization  problem,  then  increases  in  the  emissions  tax  rate 
unambiguously increase the optimal level of abatement effort, as was found by Kemp (1997) who uses a 
cost minimization framework for his analysis.  
20   The  model  assumes  imperfect  substitution  between  the  “clean  good”  and  “dirty  good”,  with  the 
willingness-to-pay for one good being a linear function of the quantities of both goods individually – i.e. 
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value increases diffusion for all degrees of product differentiation; with the impact being 
greater, the closer the substitutability of the two goods. They  also briefly consider the 
impact of a technology subsidy that reduces the fixed cost of the clean technology and 
conclude that this too will stimulate diffusion, but that it will be less efficient than the 
output subsidy.
21  
As is often the case with theoretical analyses, the specifications of the models and the 
underlying assumptions can have a significant bearing on the conclusions. Notwithstanding 
this,  there  is  a  reasonable  degree  of  consistency  between  the  findings  of  the  studies 
considered here. The studies can be classified into two broad groups: those that consider 
innovation and diffusion within an industry setting; and those that consider an individual 
firm’s decision whether to invest in an abatement technology (i.e. diffusion) or undertake 
R&D (i.e. innovation) in order to reduce its own cost of abatement.   
The studies in the first group conclude that under conditions of perfect competition, 
emission taxes and auctioned permits provide greater incentives for innovation than direct 
controls or freely allocated permits. However, there is some disagreement over the relative 
impacts of the two instruments. Under the assumption that the innovator appropriates a 
fixed (exogenous) proportion of the gains accruing to the technology adopters, Milliman & 
Prince (1989) conclude that auctioned permits provide the greatest incentive, although the 
government  may  find  it  easier  to  adjust  emission  taxes  in  response  to  the  resultant 
downward shift in marginal abatement costs. However, when the proportion is determined 
endogenously – in the form of a royalty payment – Fischer et al. (2003) find that either 
auctioned permits or emission taxes can provide the greater incentive. Emission taxes are 
likely to provide the greatest incentive if the innovator can appropriate a large proportion 
of the gains (because the technology is difficult to imitate). Montero (2002) uses a slightly 
different framework to compare the impacts of different instruments on innovation (in the 
form  of  R&D  expenditure)  in  a  situation  of  imperfect  competition  and  finds  that  the 
ranking depends on the nature of the competition.
22 Under Bertrand price competition in 
the output market the results are the same as under perfect competition: the relative ranking 
of  auctioned  permits  and  taxes  is  ambiguous,  but  both  provide  greater  incentives  for 
innovation than emission standards and freely allocated permits. However, under Cournot 
quantity  competition,  any  of  the  instruments  apart  from  freely  allocated  permits  can 
provide the greatest incentives, depending on the model parameter values.   
The studies looking at an individual firm’s decision also show that an emissions tax can 
stimulate innovation and diffusion. Jaffe & Stavins (1995) consider explicitly the firm’s 
decision  criterion  for  investing  in  a  new  abatement  technology  and  show  that,  by 
increasing  the  benefits  of  investing,  the  introduction  of  an  emissions  tax  should  bring 
                                                 
 
 
21   McGinty  &  de  Vries  (2009)  derive  expressions  for  the  necessary  technology  subsidy  values  when 
diffusion is 0% and when it is 100%.  They state – without proof – that the latter is greater than the 
former.  Provided that the relationship between the subsidy and diffusion is monotonic, this is a sufficient 
condition for increases in the subsidy value to cause increases in diffusion. 
22   Montero’s model does not include diffusion.  However, it does include spillover effects, where R&D by 
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forward the timing of its adoption by existing firms and make it more likely to be used by 
new  entrants.  The  other  two  studies  consider  the  firm’s  choice  of  optimal  “abatement 
effort”  in  the  context  of  maximizing  its  total  profits  or  minimizing  its  total  cost  of 
emissions reduction. This effort can take the form of R&D (innovation) or expenditure on 
abatement equipment (diffusion); the decision problem being the same in each case – i.e. to 
choose the optimal level of effort. Kemp (1997) assumes that the firm seeks to minimize its 
total cost of emissions reduction – implicitly assuming that its output level is fixed – and 
demonstrates both that abatement effort increases as the emissions tax increases and that 
the optimal effort is lower under direct regulation than under an equivalent tax. However, 
when  the  firm’s  output  level  is  allowed  to  vary  –  as  is  the  case  with  the  profit 
maximization problem considered by Millock &  auges (2006) – the impact of an increase 
in  the  emissions  tax  rate  on  the  level  of  abatement  effort  depends  on  the  relative 
magnitudes of the direct impact and the indirect impact (via changes in output levels) on 
the marginal benefit of abatement effort. If the latter dominates, then an increase in the 
emissions tax rate leads to a reduction in the optimal level of abatement effort.   
Only one of the industry-models considers the impact of investment subsidies. Using a 
product differentiation model of imperfect competition, McGinty & de Vries (2009) show 
that subsidizing the unit cost of a clean production technology can accelerate its diffusion. 
However, the impact depends on the degree of substitutability between clean and dirty 
products; diminishing as the products become more differentiated. In contrast, all three of 
the  individual  firm  analyses  consider  the  impact  of  investment  subsidies,  with  all 
demonstrating  that  increasing  subsidies  induce  greater  abatement  effort.  Furthermore, 
Kemp (1997) shows that the impact of an R&D subsidy is greater in the presence of an 
emissions tax than it is under an equivalent emissions-limit.   
2.2.6  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Jaffe & Stavins (1995) use their theoretical framework
23 as the basis for assessing the 
diffusion of thermal insulation in new home construction in the United States, using state-
level panel data for the years 1979-88. They derive a reduced form equation for the energy 
efficiency level chosen by developers from the marginal cost / benefit condition; in which 
the explanatory variables include energy prices, installation costs and the presence of a 
relevant building code (as a dummy variable). Separate equations are estimated for ceiling, 
floor and wall insulation, with the coefficient for energy prices being positive in all three 
equations. Although it is only significant (at the 95% level) for floor insulation, the joint 
hypothesis that all price coefficients are zero is strongly rejected. However, the coefficients 
for installation cost (which are all negative as expected) are around 2-3 times greater in 
magnitude and of comparable significance. The coefficients for the building code dummies 
are consistently insignificant (and negative in two cases), indicating that this form of direct 
regulation had minimal impact on household energy efficiency levels over the period. The 
authors use the estimated models in a simulation to compare the effects of a 10% increase 
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in energy prices (i.e. an energy tax) with those of a 10% reduction in installation costs (i.e. 
a technology subsidy) – with each being applied over the whole ten-year period. While the 
tax increases diffusion by between 2%-6% by the end of the period, the technology subsidy 
increases diffusion by between 4%-15%.  
Kemp  (1997)  models  the  diffusion  of  biological  water  treatment  technology  in  the 
Dutch  food  and  beverage  industry  based  on  a  rational  choice  threshold  model  of 
technology  adoption  decisions.  In  this  model,  a  firm  chooses  to  adopt  an  abatement 
technology  if  the  resultant  reduction  in  emission-tax  payments  is  greater  than  the 
annualized total costs of the technology, where a discount factor is applied to the savings to 
reflect uncertainty and risk aversion on the part of the decision-maker. This is translated 
into a probabilistic model under the assumption that both the savings and the costs follow a 
lognormal distribution across plants. The model is estimated econometrically using data for 
the period 1974-91 under different assumptions for the functional form of the discount 
factor  and  allowing  for  adjustment  costs.
24  The  estimated  parameters  for  the  preferred 
specification  of  the  discount  factor  are  all  significant  and  of  the  expected  sign  and 
magnitude, and the model provides a very close fit to the actual diffusion of waste-water 
treatment technologies over the period. This leads the author to conclude that the effluent 
charges  were  a  significant  positive  factor  in  the  diffusion  of  treatment  technologies. 
Indeed,  he  estimates  that  only  around  4%  of  plants  would  have  installed  waste-water 
treatment equipment by the end of the period if the charge had remained at its (low) 1974 
level, compared to the actual figure of over 40%.  
 ewell et al. (1999) estimate the impact of energy prices, energy efficiency standards 
and other factors on the energy efficiency of three types of electrical consumer durables 
(room air conditioners, central air conditioners and gas water heaters) in the USA between 
the 1970s and 1990s. The analysis utilizes a product characteristics model in which the 
frontier of technologically feasible products is described by a “transformation surface” that 
relates the bundle of product characteristics to real cost of producing that bundle. In this 
framework, innovation is represented by movements of the surface and / or movements 
along the surface. In particular, the authors identify three types of innovation: shifts in the 
surface  towards  the  origin  (overall  technological  change);  changes  in  the  slope  of  the 
surface (directional technological change); changes in the mix of products along a given 
surface (model substitution). They define the surface in terms of two characteristics, energy 
flow and cooling capacity, and incorporate innovation by allowing the coefficients of the 
two  variables  to  vary  with  time  and  (in  the  case  of  energy  flow)  energy  prices  and 
efficiency standards. Separate equations are estimated for each durable type with (slightly) 
differing  sets  of  explanatory  variables  and  time  periods.  They  find  little  evidence  that 
either energy prices or energy efficiency standards had any impact on overall technological 
change. While all but one of the relevant coefficients have the expected sign, none are 
significant.  In  contrast,  they  do  find  evidence  that  energy  prices  had  an  impact  on 
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directional technological change, with the relevant coefficients being of the correct sign 
and significant for both room and central air conditioners.        
Popp  (2002)  uses  patent  data  to  estimate  the  effect  of  energy  prices  on  energy-
efficiency  innovations  in  the  USA  between  1970  and  1994.  He  regresses  normalized 
energy  efficiency  related patent  applications  against  energy  prices,  controlling  also  for 
lagged  knowledge  stock  and  government  R&D.
25  The  estimated  coefficient  for  energy 
prices  is  highly  significant;  giving  a  short-run  price  elasticity  of  0.06  and  a  long-run 
elasticity 0.354. Thus, a 10% increase in energy prices would be expected to increase the 
number of energy efficiency related patents by around 3.5% in the long run. The estimated 
mean lag is less than 4 years, leading the author to conclude that the imposition of a carbon 
/ energy tax would lead to a fairly quick shift towards environmentally friendly innovation. 
Hoglund Isaksson (2005) estimates abatement cost functions for the reduction of NOX 
emissions in three industrial sectors in Sweden (energy, pulp and paper, chemicals and 
food). The analysis uses a double-hurdle model applied to a pooled sample of 114 plants 
across the three sectors. The data covers the period 1990-96, which spans the introduction 
of the charge on NOX emissions in 1992. The estimated cost curves have a similar shape in 
all three sectors, with minimal (or even negative) costs over a relatively broad range of 
emission  reductions  and  then  a  steep  rise  as  reductions  exceed  a  threshold  level.  The 
analysis does not explicitly consider the issue of innovation. However, it does find that 
abatement  cost  curves  shifted  downwards  significantly  over  the  period.  In  the  energy 
sector for example, the emission rate threshold for significant cost increases fell by around 
45% between 1991 and 1996 (from 550 to 300 kg/GWh). The author surmises that this is 
due  to  a  combination  of  technological  development  and  the  discovery  of  previously 
unrecognized opportunities. Unfortunately, while this shift coincided with the introduction 
of the NOX charge, the analysis does not provide any evidence of a causal link. 
As part of their analysis of the impacts of the French tax-subsidy scheme for NOX and 
SO2 emissions, Millock &  auges (2006) estimate the impact of the emission taxes on a 
plant’s  decision  to  install  end-of  pipe  abatement  equipment.  While  the  study  is  not 
concerned with innovation per se, the results of this part can be interpreted as showing the 
impact of emission taxes on the diffusion of abatement equipment. Under the scheme, 
taxes were imposed on  the emissions of these  air pollutants (and VOCs) by  all plants 
satisfying certain criteria. The revenue raised by the taxes was earmarked for subsidizing 
the cost of qualifying abatement technologies, for technical studies (i.e. R&D) and for 
investment in air quality surveillance systems. Using panel data for 226 plants in three 
industries (iron and steel, coke and chemicals) for the period 1900-98, the authors estimate 
a Probit model for the probability that a plant will install abatement equipment. They find 
that the total value of emissions taxes paid by the plant (i.e. for both pollutants) has a 
                                                 
 
 
25   Normalised energy efficiency patent values are calculated by dividing by the total number of patents 
granted.  This accounts for exogenous changes in patenting behaviour that affect all types of patents.  
Popp constructs a value for existing knowledge as the stock of previously granted patents, weighted by 
estimates that he derives for knowledge productivity.  He demonstrates that the exclusion of this variable 
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positive impact on its decision to invest in abatement equipment. However, the magnitude 
of the effect varies considerably across the sectors and is only significant for the iron and 
steel sector.   
Frondel et al. (2008) analyse responses to an OECD survey on environmental policy 
tools (conducted in 2003) to identify the factors that affect a firm’s decision to voluntarily 
adopt an environmental management system (EMS) and their environmental innovation 
behaviour. Innovation is captured by a binary variable that indicates whether the firm has 
“undertaken significant technical measures or changes to reduce the environmental impacts 
of production”.
26 The analysis is based on survey responses from 899 firms in Germany. 
Latent variable equations for EMS adoption and innovation are estimated simultaneously, 
with each equation including the same four sets of variables – relating to motivations, 
policy  instruments, pressure  groups  and  facility  characteristics.
27  The policy  instrument 
variables  include  five  dummy  variables  indicating  the  importance  of  different  types  of 
policy instrument, including market-based instruments such as emission taxes and tradable 
permits.  While  the  perceived  stringency  of  environmental  policy  is  found  to  be  a 
significant factor in the decision to innovate, there is no evidence that any of the individual 
policy instrument variables had any impact. The authors surmise that this suggests that it is 
stringency of environmental policy, rather than the choice of specific instrument, that is 
important for innovation. However, as the authors note, their results reflect the perceptions 
of the survey respondents and should therefore be treated as correlations rather than causal 
relationships.  
Johnstone et al. (2009) assess the impact of a range of environmental policy instruments 
on innovation in the field of renewable energy.  While they do not include environmental 
taxes in their evaluation, they do consider the impact of various price-based instruments 
including  tax  incentives  (i.e.  accelerated  depreciation,  etc.),  investment  incentives  (e.g. 
low-interest loans, guarantees, etc.) and price-support policies (e.g. feed in tariffs and price 
guarantees).    They  analyse  the  impacts  for  five  different  groups  of  renewable  energy 
technologies  –  wind,  solar,  geothermal,  ocean,  biomass  and  waste-to-energy  –  using  a 
panel dataset of EPO
28 patent filings for these technologies across 25 countries over the 
period 1978-2003. A fixed effects negative binomial model is estimated, controlling for 
electricity prices and consumption, total EPO filings (as a proxy for differences / changes 
scientific capacity and patenting propensity) and the signing of the Kyoto Protocol (to 
capture expectations about future policy). Only public R&D expenditures, feed-in tariffs 
and renewable energy certificate (REC) targets are represented by continuous variables; 
the  other policy  instruments being  represented  by  dummy  variables  indicating  whether 
they were in place in a particular year. Consequently, for these variables, the model takes 
                                                 
 
 
26   The next question on the survey asks whether these are changes in production processes or end-of-pipe 
technologies.  However, no distinction is made between the two types of innovation in this study. 
27   In order to avoid identification problems, some individual variables are omitted from one equation or the 
other. 
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no account of the stringency of the instruments – in particular the differing magnitudes of 
the tax measures and investment incentives.   
Initially,  the  authors  estimate  the  model  with  all of  the policy  instruments  included 
individually. They find that public policy plays an important role in inducing innovation; 
with  public  R&D  expenditure  and  the  passage  of  the  Kyoto  Protocol  both  having  a 
significant positive impact on patenting in renewable energy overall and specifically on 
patenting activity in wind and solar technologies.  However, the impacts of the individual 
policy instruments vary considerably across the different technologies. In particular, while 
REC  targets  have  a  significant  positive  impact  on  innovation  in  wind  and  geothermal 
technologies, feed-in tariffs only have a significant impact on patenting activity in solar 
energy.  This reflects the fact that the REC targets  are  generic and hence favour those 
technologies that are closest to market, while feed-in tariffs are technology-specific and 
thus can provide incentives for (currently) high-cost technologies.
29   
Of the policy instruments represented by dummy variables, investment incentives have 
a positive impact for all technologies except wind, but are only significant for geothermal 
and biomass (and solar at the 10% level).  In contrast, neither tax measures, nor voluntary 
programmes,  are  found  to  have  a  significant  impact  on  innovation  for  any  of  the 
technologies.  To a certain extent, this may reflect a relative lack of stringency of these 
instruments (which is not captured by the dummy variables). However, the authors surmise 
that it may also reflect multi-collinearity between some of the policy dummy variables 
(particularly between investment incentives and tax measures) – making it impossible to 
isolate the respective impacts of these instruments.     
 De Vries & Medhi (2008) also use patent data to investigate the relative importance of 
environmental regulations and fuel prices on innovation in automotive emission control 
technologies,  distinguishing  between  post-combustion  devices  and  engine  re-design 
technologies.  They  estimate  a  panel  data  model  using  data  from  the  US,  Japan  and 
Germany over the period 1978-2001, controlling for industry value added (as a proxy for 
the  scope  of  technological  opportunities),  and  total patent  applications  (as  a proxy  for 
differences / changes in patenting propensity). Environmental regulation is represented by 
two dummy variables indicting the introduction of on-board diagnostic (OBD) regulations 
in the US.
30 The results of the analysis suggest that the relative impacts of regulation and 
market  forces  differ  between  the  two  types  of  technology.  For  post-combustion 
technologies, both of the regulations are significant, while fuel prices have no significant 
impact. In contrast, the opposite is the case for engine re-design technologies, with fuel 
prices having a significant impact, but regulation having no discernable effect. While the 
                                                 
 
 
29   For example, in 2004, the feed-in tariff in Germany for solar energy was five times greater than the 
respective tariffs for wind and geothermal. 
30   Because of the international nature of the automotive industry and the importance of the US market, 
regulations introduced in the US appear to have been an important driver for innovation by overseas 
manufacturers.    Regulations  mandating  the  installation  of  OBD  systems  were  first  introduced  in 
California  in  1988.  A  more  sophisticated  system  was  mandated  by  the  1990  US  Clean  Air  Act 
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analysis does not explicitly consider the impact of fuel taxes, it suggests that increase in 
automotive  fuel  taxes  would  have  a  major  impact  on  innovation  in  relation  to  engine 
design. The estimated coefficient for fuel prices (1.287) implies that a 10 US cent increase 
in fuel prices would induce a 14% increase in patenting activity.
31 
The empirical studies considered above cover a range of different technology areas – 
spanning  energy  efficiency  (both  product  and  process),  renewable  energy,  and  air  and 
water pollution abatement. While in some cases, they assess the impact of energy prices 
rather than environmental taxes per se, they provide a clear picture of the likely impact of 
environmental and energy-related taxes on eco-innovation.  
Three of the studies assess the impact on diffusion of existing technologies. All of these 
find  that  environmental  taxes  /  energy  prices  have  a  positive  impact  on  diffusion.  In 
particular,  the  water  effluent  charges  in  The  Netherlands  appear  to  have  had  a  major 
impact  on  the  adoption  of  waste-water  treatment  equipment by  the  food  and beverage 
industry in that country. However, there is some evidence to suggest that the effectiveness 
of taxes / prices may vary across sectors (e.g. NOx / SO2 abatement in France) and that 
investment  incentives  /  subsidies  may  be  more  effective  in  some  cases  (e.g.  thermal 
insulation in the US).  
Three of the studies use patent data to assess the impact of environmental taxes and 
energy prices on innovation, with one of these also assessing the impact of investment 
incentives. All of these find a significant positive impact, although this depends on the 
particular sub-sector (e.g. renewable energy) and / or the type of innovation. In particular, 
the evidence from the automotive emissions control study suggests that taxes / prices may 
be  more  effective  in  promoting  process-related  innovation  (e.g.  engine  re-design)  than 
innovation in end-of-pipe technologies. One of the studies takes a different approach, using 
a product characteristics model to decompose improvements in the energy efficiency of 
consumer durables. This finds that while electricity prices did not appear to affect overall 
technological change (i.e. shifts in the product cost / energy efficiency frontier), they did 
have a positive impact on directional technological change (i.e. the slope of the frontier).       
2.2.7  CASE STUDIES 
Christiansen & Skjaerseth (2005) undertake a comparative analysis of the impacts of 
climate change policies on the petroleum sectors in Norway and The Netherlands during 
the 1990s. These countries were selected because of their very different policy approaches; 
with the Norwegian petroleum sector being subject to a CO2 tax since 1991 (as part of a 
portfolio  of  measures
32),  while  The  Netherlands  has  relied  on  a  series  of  voluntary 
                                                 
 
 
31   The coefficient represents the semi-elasticity of patent applications with respect to fuel prices.  While the 
authors do not state explicitly, the implication is that prices are expressed in US dollars (they are obtained 
from the IEA Energy Prices and Taxes Database).  Consequently, the impact of a 10 US cent increase in 
the fuel prices is given by exp( 1.287 x 0.1 ) – 1 = 0.137  
32   In addition to the tax, the portfolio included publicly-funded R&D support schemes, gas flaring permits 
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agreements on energy efficiency.
33 Both approaches appear to have been effective, in that 
CO2 emissions per unit production fell by around 22% between 1990 and 2001 in Norway, 
while  energy  efficiency  improved  by  around  35%  in  The  Netherlands  over  the  same 
period. However, there were marked differences between the tow countries in terms of the 
nature  of  the  innovation  that  occurred.  In  The  Netherlands,  technological  change  was 
incremental, reflecting a steady diffusion of available (i.e. known) technology. In contrast, 
the authors find evidence of more radical innovations and adaptations by the Norwegian 
petroleum sector – including the development of energy-efficient gas turbines, installation 
of waste heat recovery units, process modifications and improved utilization of process 
heat. While the authors acknowledge the impossibility of proving a causal link between 
policy intervention and innovation (in the context of their case study), they conclude that 
the CO2 tax played a key role in the development and implementation of these radical 
innovations; with the benefits of reduced tax payments providing an important incentive. 
However, they also conclude that the impacts of the two instruments were conditioned by 
the political contexts in which they were applied and the problem characteristics in the 
respective countries (e.g. the economic significance of the sector, size of installations, etc.).     
Knigge & Görlach (2005) summarize the findings of a comprehensive analysis of the 
impacts of the ETR in Germany that was undertaken jointly by Ecologic and the German 
Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) – including the impacts on innovation and 
market diffusion of environmentally friendly products and technologies.
34 Based on a series 
of case studies, the study concluded that the ETR had a “noticeable effect” on innovation 
and diffusion, although it was not possible to quantify the scale of that effect. In particular, 
the ETR is identified as being a central factor in the development of gas-powered vehicles. 
The  study  identifies  a  number  of  different  routes  by  which  the  impacts  of  the  ETR 
occurred. First, the payback period for energy efficient products was reduced as a result of 
the energy tax increases and the various exemptions favouring efficient energy use and 
renewable energy sources. Second, the predictable nature of the energy taxes (as opposed 
to  widely  fluctuating  oil  prices)  reduced  uncertainties  about  the  benefits  of  energy 
efficiency investments. Third, the reduction in employers’ social contribution payments 
tended to reduce the costs of labour intensive innovation processes – such as research and 
development,  energy  consultancy  and  technology  installation.  Finally,  the  ETR  had  a 
signaling effect, strengthening awareness of the need for more efficient and rational energy 
use. 
Mickwitz  et  al.  (2008)  examine  a  number  of  “claims”  that  have  been  made  in  the 
environmental  policy  literature  about  the  relationship  between  policy  instruments  and 
                                                 
 
 
33   The Dutch oil and gas industry first signed a Declaration of Intent with the government in 1995.  This was 
translated  into  a  Long  Term  Agreement  (LTA)  on  energy  efficiency  in  the  following  year,  with  an 
improvement  target  of  20%  over  the  period  1989-2000.    In  2001,  a  new  LTA  was  signed  which 
committed firms to implementing energy efficiency measures with a positive NPV at a 15% discount rate 
or a five year payback period.  
34   A separate report in German by Görlach et al. (2005) provides details of the evaluation of the innovation 
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innovation, based on experiences in two industrial sectors in Finland: pulp and paper and 
the  manufacture  of  diesel  engines  for  ships.  In  particular,  they  assess  the  claims  that 
“environmental taxes are superior to other policy instruments with respect to innovation” 
and that “R&D subsidies have limited impacts on innovation”. With respect to the first 
claim, the evidence provided by the two case studies is mixed. The authors conclude that 
energy  taxation  had  a  negligible  impact  on  innovation  in  the pulp  and paper  industry. 
However, this is likely to have been due to the low level of the tax and the exemptions that 
applied to the sector. In contrast, they find that the differentiation of Swedish fairway and 
port fees (on the basis of SO2 and NOX emissions) was a significant factor driving the 
installation of in-engine NOX reduction equipment in ferries operating between the two 
countries.
35 With respect to R&D subsidies, the authors conclude that the evidence does not 
support the claim that these have little effect. In particular, they find that R&D subsidies 
accelerated the development of ship engine emissions reduction technologies.    
The findings of the three case studies are consistent with those of the empirical analyses 
reviewed  in  the  previous  section.  Environmental  taxes  and  investment  subsidies  have 
proved significant in promoting both innovation and diffusion, although not universally so. 
Furthermore, the case studies provide some useful insights about the ways in which the 
impacts occur and the factors that may be important in promoting innovation. In particular, 
they  suggest  the  need  for  a  tax  rate  that  is  sufficiently  high  to  provide  a  meaningful 
incentive and signaling effect, and that is fixed for a sufficiently long period of time to 
reduce uncertainty about the future benefits of investment. 
2.2.8  CONCLUSIONS 
The studies reviewed in the preceding sections suggest that environmental regulation in 
general, and price-based policy instruments such as environmental taxes and investment 
subsidies in particular, can (in theory) and do (in practice) have a positive impact on both 
innovation  and  diffusion  of  environmental  technologies.  However,  the  supporting 
empirical  and  case  study  evidence  is  not  universal  and  the  effectiveness  of  these 
instruments would appear to vary across different sectors and different types of innovation. 
To a certain extent, such differences can be explained by the theoretical models. In 
particular, the impact of environmental taxes (relative to other instruments) is predicted to 
depend on the competitive structures of the markets in which the regulated firms operate 
and on the ability of innovator firms to appropriate the benefits accruing to other firms 
during diffusion. However, a number of other potential factors have been identified in the 
literature which may affect the impact of price-based policy instruments on innovation. 
Jaffe  et  al.  (2002)  caution  that  the  impact  of  price-based  policy  instruments  on 
technology diffusion may be adversely affected by a number of potential market failures, 
including  information  failures,  principle-agent  problems  (e.g.  landlord-tenant),  capital 
                                                 
 
 
35   Although the tax was introduced in Sweden, it was also payable by Finnish ferry operators entering 
Swedish ports and hence affected their investment decisions.  This is another example of the cross-border 
impact of environmental policy interventions on innovation found by Lanjouw & Mody (1996) – see 
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market failures and positive adoption spillovers. In addition, while not market failures as 
such; uncertainty over future returns and the (associated) use of high discount rates for 
investment decisions can also undermine the effectiveness of price-based instruments in 
stimulating diffusion. However, as was noted above, the findings from the case study of 
the ETR in Germany suggest that an environmental tax may actually reduce the level of 
uncertainty over future returns provided that it is of sufficient magnitude and longevity. 
Skjaerseth  &  Christiansen  (2005)  emphasize  that  the  relationship  between  policy 
instruments (of all types) and technological change is extremely complicated. They argue 
that account must be taken of the political / industrial context in which policy instruments 
are  introduced,  and  the  nature  of  the  environmental problem  that  they  are  intended  to 
address.  In  particular,  they  make  a  distinction  between  “malign  problems”  where 
technological change involves net costs for target groups, and “benign problems” where 
there  are  widespread  “no-regret”  opportunities  for  change.  Based  on  a  comparative 
analysis of four different case studies, they conclude that mandatory policy instruments 
(including environmental taxes) are more effective in promoting short-term technological 
change when the problems are malign, but that low legitimacy (with the target group) may 
undermine long-term technological change. However, when problems are benign, or when 
long-term change requires cooperation, voluntary policy instruments are likely to be more 
effective.   
Johnstone  (2005)  questions  the  focus  of  the  theoretical  and  empirical  analyses 
(reviewed  above)  on  the  impact  of  environmental  policy  instruments  on  the  rate  of 
technological change; arguing that the direction of technological change is as important – 
if not more so. It is not just the quantity of innovation that is important. It is also important 
that innovation is socially-optimal in the sense that it minimizes the cost of attaining a 
particular environmental goal in the long term. Inappropriate innovation today may result 
in “lock-in” to a sub-optimal technological path for the future.   
With  this  in  mind,  he  identifies  a  number  of  issues  that  can  adversely  affect  the 
direction of innovation, and that should be taken into account when selecting and designing 
policy  instruments:  technological  market  failures
36;  missing  markets  for  certain 
environmental  attributes  of  innovation;  policy  incidence;  and  joint  production  of 
emissions.  Most  studies  of  the  innovation  effects  of  environmental  policy  instruments 
assume that the only missing market is that for the environmental good (bad). However, in 
practice there may be other markets that are missing (or incomplete), which can adversely 
affect transmission of innovation incentives. This is particularly so in the area of waste / 
resource management, where instruments applied at the end of the product lifecycle may 
have little or no impact on product design innovation. Even if all markets are complete 
except for the environmental externality, the point of incidence of the policy intervention 
may be more important for the direction of innovation than the choice of particular policy 
instrument. For example, a limit or standard applied directly to the emissions of a pollutant 
may be more effective in promoting optimal innovation than a tax applied to a proxy input 
variable. Finally, when there is joint production of pollutants (e.g. CO2 and air pollutants 
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from vehicle engines), there is a danger that if policy instruments (of whatever type) are 
applied to one pollutant in isolation, the resultant innovation may reduce emissions of that 
pollutant at the expense of increases in the others.   
In a related point, he highlights the importance of using appropriate indicators when 
assessing the impact of policy instruments on innovation; emphasizing the need for these 
to reflect both the rate of innovation and the direction. A necessary condition for this is that 
the  indicators  must  provide  an  accurate  and  detailed  picture  of  actual  innovation. 
Unfortunately, this is difficult to achieve in practice. For example, the use of patent data as 
a measure of innovation requires the identification of relevant environmental technologies. 
This  is  likely  to  be  easier  for  end-of-pipe  technologies  than  for  process-related 
technologies, meaning that the latter tend to be under-represented relative to their actual 
incidence. To the extent that process-related innovation is growing in importance, or is 
more important for certain sectors or types of environmental problem, changes in the value 
of the indicator may significantly understate the actual rate of innovation and misrepresent 
the direction. 
All  of  this  suggests  that  caution  should  be  exercised  in  drawing  general,  definitive 
conclusions about the impacts of price-based policy instruments such as environmental 
taxes  and  investment  subsidies  on  innovation  –  particularly  relative  to  other  policy 
instruments.  While  it  would  appear  that  they  can  be  effective  in  stimulating  both 
innovation and diffusion in many cases – at least in terms of the rate of technological 
change,  there  may  be  situations  in  which  other  policy  instruments  may  be  more 
appropriate. In general, the stringency and point of incidence of an environmental policy 
intervention may be more important than the choice of a particular policy instrument in 
determining the rate and direction of eco-innovation. 
3  THE GI FORS MODEL 
The  simulation  instrument  –  the  global  model  GINFORS  (Global  I terindustry 
FORecasting  System)  –  describes  the  economic  development,  energy  demand,  CO2 
emissions and resource inputs for 50 countries, 2 regions, 41 product groups, 12 energy 
carriers and 9 resources. The regions are “OPEC” and “Rest of the World”. The explicitly 
modelled region “OPEC” and the 50 countries cover about 95% of world GDP and 95% of 
global CO2 emissions. The aggregated region “Rest of the World” is needed for the closure 
of the system. The model is documented in Meyer et al. (2007), Meyer & Lutz (2007) and 
Lutz et al. (2010). Current applications of the model can be found in Giljum et al. (2008) 
and Lutz & Meyer (2009a, 2009b). An update of the material models is provided in Lutz & 
Giljum (2009). The related German model PANTA RHEI has been applied to endogenize 
technological change in a few industry sectors as iron and steel and paper (Lutz et al., 
2005). 
The main difference to neoclassical CGE models is the representation of prices, which 
are determined due to the mark-up hypothesis by unit costs and not specified as long run 
competitive prices. But this does not mean that the model is demand side driven, as the use 
of input-output models might suggest. Even though demand determines production, all 
demand variables depend on relative prices that are given by unit costs of the firms using 
the mark-up hypothesis, which is typical for oligopolistic markets. The difference between   gws gws gws gws       Discussion Paper       2010/2 
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CGE models and GINFORS can be found in the underlying market structure and not in the 
accentuation of either market side. Firms are setting the prices depending on their costs and 
on  the  prices  of  competing  imports.  Demand  is  reacting  to  price  signals  and  thus 
determining  production.  Hence,  the  modeling  of  GINFORS  includes  both  demand  and 
supply elements.   
Allowance prices and carbon tax rates are endogenous to the model. To avoid long 
solving procedures, the prices are changed in an iterative process manually until the GHG 
reduction target is reached. Allowance prices increase the shadow prices of energy carriers 
and reduce energy demand according to the specific price elasticities. Different allocation 
methods therefore have no direct influence on energy demand and the emission levels in 
the model. But increasing profits of private companies in the case of grandfathering deliver 
other macroeconomic impacts than government spending out of auctioning revenues. 
All parameters of the model are estimated econometrically, and different specifications 
of  the  functions  are  tested  against  each  other,  which  gives  the  model  an  empirical 
validation. An additional confirmation of the model structure as a whole is given by the 
convergence  property  of  the  solution  which  has  to  be  fulfilled  year  by  year.  The 
econometric estimations build on times series from OECD, IMF and IEA from 1980 to 
2006. For a number of variables the data were only available for a shorter time period. The 
modelling philosophy of GINFORS is close to that of INFORUM type modelling (Almon, 
1991)  and  to  that  of  the  model  E3ME  from  Cambridge  Econometrics  (Barker  et  al., 
2007a).  Common  properties  and  minor  differences  between  E3ME  and  GINFORS  are 
discussed in Barker et al (2007b). 
4  SCE ARIOS 
To  investigate  the  impacts  of  an  ETR  for  Europe  six  separate  scenarios  have  been 
designed in the petrE project to understand a variety of tax reform options. Each scenario is 
identified by an acronym. The final letter indicates the baseline to which it is compared 
with L for low energy prices and H for high energy prices. 
 The  scenario  analysis  allows  for  an  understanding  of  different  revenue  recycling 
methods and various scales of ETR in order to meet different greenhouse gas emissions 
targets. All scenarios were examined in both E3ME and GINFORS. The scenarios are: 
•  BL: Baseline (low energy prices), 
•  BH: Baseline sensitivity with high oil price (reference case), 
•  Scenario S1L: ETR designed to meet unilateral EU 2020 GHG target with revenue 
recycling, 
•  Scenario S1H: ETR designed to meet unilateral EU 2020 GHG target (high oil 
price) with revenue recycling, 
•  Scenario S2H: ETR designed to meet unilateral EU 2020 GHG target (high oil 
price) with revenue recycling, 10% of revenues are spent on eco-innovation 
measures, 
•  Scenario S3H: ETR designed to meet EU 2020 GHG target with international 
cooperation (high oil price) with revenue recycling. 
The  baseline  with  low  energy  prices  BL  has  been  calibrated  to  the  2007  PRIMES 
baseline to 2030, published by the European Commission (DG TREN, 2008). For the high 
oil price baseline (reference case BH) the effect of a higher oil price, particularly over the   gws gws gws gws       Discussion Paper       2010/2 
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period 2008-10 is assumed. In this scenario coal and gas prices develop in line with the 
increases to the oil price. In this scenario energy prices are close to the assumptions in the 
current IEA World Energy Outlook (2008). 
Each of the ETR scenarios has the same key taxation components: 
•  a carbon tax rate is introduced to all non EU ETS sectors equal to the carbon price 
in the EU ETS that delivers an overall 20% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions 
by 2020, in the international cooperation scenario this is extended to 30%, 
•  aviation is included in the EU ETS at the end of Phase 2, 
•  power generation sector EU ETS permits are 100% auctioned in Phase 3 of the EU 
ETS, 
•  all other EU ETS permits are 50% auctioned in 2013 increasing to 100% in 2020, 
•  material taxes are introduced at 5% of total price in 2010 increasing to 15% by 
2020. 














In  scenarios  S1L,  S1H  and  S3H  environmental  tax  revenues  are  recycled  through 
reductions in income tax rates and social security contributions in each of the member 
states, such that there is no direct change in tax revenues. In scenario S2H 10% of the 
environmental tax revenues are recycled through spending on eco-innovation measures, the 
remaining 90% is recycled through the same measures as in the other scenarios. The eco-
innovation spending is split across power generation and housing according to tax revenues 
from the corporate and household sector. In GINFORS the share of renewable sources in 
electricity production is increased due to the additional investment. The rest of additional 
investment goes to household energy efficiency spending. Investment needed for a certain 
increase in RES or efficiency improvement is based on German and Austrian experience 
(Lehr  et  al.,  2008  and  2009,  Grossmann  et  al.,  2008,  Lutz  &  Meyer,  2008).  This 
assumption is quite conservative as parameters for other countries can be assumed to be   gws gws gws gws       Discussion Paper       2010/2 
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more positive (less money needed for renewable energy technology installation or energy 
efficiency gains). 
In  scenarios  S1L  and  S1H  the  20%  GHG  target  translates  into  a  15%  reduction  of 
energy-related  carbon  emissions  against  1990  as  other  emissions  such  as  methane  and 
nitrous  oxide  already  have  been  reduced  above  average.  The  target  is  reached  by  a 
tightened EU ETS cap and the introduction of a carbon tax on the non-ETS sector. The tax 
rate applied is equal to the carbon price in the EU ETS that will deliver 20% reduction in 
GHG by 2020.  
ETR tax will be allotted to energy outputs, i.e. the final use of energy, and will be based 
on the carbon content of each fuel. Carbon prices are assumed to be fully passed on to 
consumers.  All  carbon  taxes  will  be  in  addition  to  any  existing  unilateral  carbon  and 
energy taxes. The carbon reductions in the different EU Member States (MS) will be those 
that the same carbon tax increase across the EU produces.  
100% of the revenues, including EU ETS auctioning revenues, carbon tax revenues and 
material tax revenues will be recycled. The proportion of tax raised by industry will be 
recycled into a reduction in employers’ social security contributions, which will in turn 
reduce  the  cost  of  labour.  Recycling  will  be  additional  to  the  existing  ETRs  in  some 
member states. Revenues raised from households will be recycled through standard rate 
income  tax  reductions.  Traditional  energy  tax  revenues  will be  lower  compared  to  the 
respective baseline, as the tax base (energy consumption) is reduced. So revenue-neutrality 
does not mean budget-neutrality of an ETR.  
Table 1:  International energy prices in the two baseline scenarios  
EU: Energy import prices in $ (2005) / boe  EU: Energy import prices in $ /boe
Baseline BL Baseline BL
Year Oil Gas Coal Oil Gas Coal 
1990 35.5 35.5 16.9 - - -
1995 21.8 16.7 13.5 - - -
2000 32.3 32.4 8.9 - - -
2005 54.5 40.1 14.8 54.4 40.1 14.8
2010 54.5 43.3 13.7 60.0 47.7 15.1
2015 57.8 45.8 14.3 70.8 56.1 17.5
2020 61.1 48.9 14.7 83.4 66.8 20.1
Baseline BH Baseline BH
Year Oil Gas Coal Oil  Gas Coal
2010 103.1 81.9 25.9 113.5 90.2 28.5
2015 113.2 89.7 28.0 138.6 109.8 34.2
2020 123.5 98.8 29.7 168.6 134.9 40.6  
 
Scenario S3H is used to investigate the effect that international cooperation would have 
on competitiveness and resources. In this scenario we assume that the rest of the world 
takes action towards reducing carbon emissions. International action is expected to reduce 
the  loss  of  competitiveness  the  EU  would  face  if  it  embarked  on  unilateral  action. 
However, in this scenario, the tax levied is larger and is designed to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by 30% in 2020, rather than 20% in the preceding scenarios.    gws gws gws gws       Discussion Paper       2010/2 
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Scenario S3H leans on scenario S1H but with higher targets in line with the EU’s stated 
policy objective of a 30% GHG reduction against 1990 until 2020. In GINFORS ETS and 
ETR is modelled in the major OECD countries. CO2 prices in these countries are equal to 
EU  prices.  Emerging  economies  will  introduce  a  CO2  tax  recycled  via  income  tax 
reductions.  CO2  tax  rates  will  be  25%  of  EU  (OECD)  prices  in  2020.  Restricted 
participation  of  emerging  economies  takes  into  account  shared  but  differentiated 
responsibility (lower historic burden, lower GDP per capita) based on a post-Kyoto project 
for the German Ministry of Economy in 2007 (Lutz & Meyer, 2009a). The 30% reduction 
will be in European emissions, without trying to take account of JI/CDM transactions that 
could be on top of the extra EU carbon reduction.  
Earlier analyses (Lehr et al., 2008, ISI et al., 2009, Boira-Segarra, 2004, Kammen et al., 
2004, Moreno and López, 2007) studied the impacts of large shares of RES in the energy 
mix for different countries. The overall question in these studies has been the impact of 
increasing RES shares on the economy, especially on the labour market. For the scope of 
our work here it is interesting to note that macroeconomic impacts of higher RES shares 
mainly depend on  
(1) additional  investment  in  RES  (minus  lower  investment  in  conventional,  i.e. 
fossil and nuclear power) obviously even more so if a country has the respective 
industry 
(2) additional (net) exports due to better international competitiveness for RES (first 
mover advantage), 
(3) lower fossil fuel needs, 
(4) the cost differences between RES and conventional energy and 
(5) the shift from capital- and energy-intensive industries to labour- and technology-
intensive industries 
which all are driven by international energy prices, carbon prices, the policy framework 
and the RES technology development itself. Innovation comes into the play at various 
stages:  Firstly,  innovation  drives  the  currently  positive  additional  costs  of  RES 
technologies down and into the negative realms, depending on the respective fossil fuel 
scenario. Secondly, innovative products increase the competitive advantage of products on 
the international markets. Though a fair share of the RES technology production in Europe 
is  traded  in  Europe,  innovation  will  still  provide  an  edge  on  current  and  emerging 
international  markets.  The  EmployRES  study  (ISI  et  al.,  2009)  finds  for  Europe  that 
currently the strong investment impulses - based on installations in Europe and exports to 
the rest of the world - dominate the economic impact of RES policies and therefore lead to 
positive overall effects. The results in the study suggest that this positive balance can only 
be kept up in the future, if the competitive position of European manufacturers of RES 
technology is even improved: The authors strongly recommend “policies which promote 
technological  innovation  in  RES  and  lead  to  a  continued  and  rapid  reduction  of  their 
costs”. 
(1) and (2) will have substantial impacts in the short and medium-term, whereas (3) 
adds up and will show positive stock impacts mainly in the long-term. (4) strongly depend 
on the global development. (5) may have significant effects on employment.   gws gws gws gws       Discussion Paper       2010/2 
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Impacts of additional investment (1) have already been analysed in scenario S2H of the 
petrE project. To focus on the impacts of eco-innovation two additional scenarios have 
been designed, that build on scenario S2H of the petrE project: 
•  S2HE: ETR with revenue recycling designed to meet the unilateral EU 2020 GHG 
target (high oil price), 10% of revenues are spent on eco-innovation measures, trade 
shares of EU-27 economies with the rest of the world in machinery and electrical 
machinery increase by .1% due to the deployment of the fast growing RES markets. 
This assumption is based on the strong EU policy effort to increase the share on 
renewable energy in final energy consumption to 20% by 2020 (ISI et al., 2009) 
and the possibility of very strong world market development of the RES until 2020 
(EREC  2008),  which  offers  additional  export  opportunities  for  European  RES 
industries. 
•  S2HI: ETR with revenue recycling designed to meet the unilateral EU 2020 GHG 
target (high oil price), 10% of revenues are spent on eco-innovation measures, input 
structures of the utility sector are changed according to the input structure of the 
German RES industry (Lehr et al., 2008). 
S2HE looks at the possible role of international trade, S2HI analyses changing in the 
input  structure  of  the  utility  sector,  i.e.  from  conventional  electricity  production  to 
renewables. In the petrE project (as in GHK et al., 2007) only the energy inputs of the 
utility sector had been adapted to changes in the energy input mix. 
Both scenarios focus on RES and efficiency technologies. As mentioned above, an ETR 
will trigger a variety of innovations as such. Therefore the results can be thought of as 
conservative  in  the  sense  that  innovations  e.g.  on  automotive  energy  consumption, 
industrial efficiency, community efforts etc. are not included explicitly.  
5  OVERVIEW OF MODELLI G RESULTS 
The  main  results  of  the  simulations  are  highlighted  in  Table  2.  High  energy  price 
scenarios are in the centre of the discussion. They are close to medium and long-term price 
expectations of the IEA (2008). In the baseline scenario BH with high energy prices, EU-
27 carbon emissions will be 7.2% below 1990 level in 2020. EU-15 has committed in the 
Kyoto protocol to reduce its GHG emissions 8% below 1990 levels in the period 2008-
2012. As emissions in the new member states are substantially below their 1990 levels 
today, EU-27 will keep its emissions more or less constant over the coming decade. As in 
the PRIMES baseline an ETS price of 18 Euro/t in 2008 prices is assumed in 2020.   gws gws gws gws       Discussion Paper       2010/2 
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Table 2:  Main results in the different scenarios  
Scenario
Target in 








in year 2020 2015 2020 2020 2020 2020
BH 18 -7.2 0.0
S1H 20% GHG 68 -0.22 -0.57 0.36 -15.1 -8.4
S2H 20% GHG 61 -0.13 -0.30 0.41 -15.2 -8.5
S2HE 20% GHG 61 -0.09 -0.04 0.51 -15.1 -8.4




In scenario S1H the ETS price and carbon tax rate has to be increased to 68 Euro2008/t 
of CO2 to reach the 20% GHG reduction target, which is equal to a 15% reduction of CO2 
emissions  against  1990  as  other  greenhouse  gases  have  already  been  reduced  above 
average. Compared to the baseline, CO2 emissions are 8.4 % lower in 2020 which means 
an additional 1% p.a. reduction in the period 2012 to 2020. GDP will be about 0.6% lower 
compared to the baseline in 2020. This means that annual average growth rates will be less 
than  0.1%  below  their  baseline  development.  This  is  especially  low  compared  to  the 
current financial and economic crisis, with a GDP deviation against the baseline of around 
6% in 2009. 
As the recycling mechanism reduces labour costs and the tax burden is shifted from 
labour-intensive to carbon- and material-intensive sectors employment will be 0.36% (or 
more than 800.000 jobs) higher than in the baseline. The ETR is not fully budget-neutral 
for the EU economies that can slightly increase their net savings. If this extra saving is 
spent, negative GDP impacts will be further reduced. 
If part of the revenues is used for investment in low-carbon technologies, the carbon 
price in scenario S2H can even be lower (61 Euro2008/t in 2020) and the GDP loss halved 
against scenario S1H to only 0.3%, as the investment in renewable energies is assumed to 
be additional. Employment impacts will be more positive than in scenario S1H. The 10% 
investment in low-carbon technologies will amount to more than 20 Bill. Euro in 2020. 
The Obama administration currently plans to invest 15 Bill. US-Dollar p.a. in that area in 
the next four years. 
If we assume additional EU exports of RES technologies in scenario S2HE, GDP could 
be almost the same as in the baseline in 2020. Employment will be 0.51% (or more than 
1 mill. jobs) higher than in the baseline. A shift in the input structure of the utility sector 
towards machinery and electrical machinery, that reflects the different nature of RES in 
relation to conventional electricity generation, has also smaller additional positive impacts 
on GDP and employment compared to scenario S2H. 
The following figures show impacts of the different scenarios in comparison to the 
baseline BH. According to Figure 3 GDP is slightly lower. The comparison of scenario 
S1H with the other 3 scenarios shows that additional RES investment (S2H), additional 
RES exports (S2HE) and the inclusion of different input structures of the RES industries 
(S2HI)  have  per  se  positive  GDP  impacts.  Both  results  are  in  line  with  model-based 
analysis in the EMPLOY-RES study (ISI et al., 2009). 
In  contrast  to  GDP,  employment  increases  in  all  scenarios  (Figure  4).  Due  to  the 
scenario  design  the  structure  of  the  EU  economies  is  shifted  from  energy-intensive  to   gws gws gws gws       Discussion Paper       2010/2 
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labour-intensive  sectors.  The  magnitude  of  the  employment  gain  is  influenced  by  the 
carbon price and the tax shift, the underlying energy prices and the production loss. The 
largest part of the employment increase stems from the ETR (scenario S2), whereas a shift 
in industry structures (S2HI) and additional RES exports (S2HE) are both positive for the 
labour market but less important. As ETR is directly targeting labour costs, it is better 
suited  to  create  additional  jobs  than  positive  effects  of  eco-innovation  on  the  industry 
structure or export markets. 
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Figure 3:  GDP of EU 27 in Bill. US Dollars (PPPs) in prices of 2005 in different scenarios   













Figure 4:  Employment in EU 27 in 1000 in different scenarios   percentage deviations 
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6  RESULTS OF SCE ARIO S2H 
The impacts of the modelled ETS and ETR on country level strongly depend on country 
specifics  including  energy  use,  economic  structure  and  different  social  systems  and 
behaviour, e.g. reactions to labour cost changes. In countries with high carbon intensity 
additional  revenues  and  expenditures  are  higher  than  in  countries  with  lower  carbon 
intensity. Revenues in the UK are below EU average, which is one important reason, why 
impacts on the UK are quite low. Countries with high emissions in the ETS sector such as 
Germany and most of the new member states will raise a lot of money when auctioning the 
emission rights that is used for reducing labour costs and for additional RES and efficiency 
investment, which partly explains positive impacts on the labour market. The relevance 
and  opportunities  of  additional  revenues  have  not  yet  been  fully  perceived  by  policy 
makers. 
Impacts of scenario S2H are between 0 and -1% of GDP in 2020 for the large EU 
economies with the exception of Italy (Figure 6). Germany can even keep its GDP due to 
its strong RES industry. Other countries in the world slightly gain competitiveness against 
EU countries, as export prices in most EU countries and sectors increase (Figure 5). This is 
mainly  due  to  the  fact,  that  carbon  tax  revenues  are  recycled  back  via  income  tax 
reductions which are not part of production costs. Energy exporting economies such as 
Russia or South Africa will lose exports, if EU energy demand declines. 
Employment impacts of scenario S2H are positive for almost all EU countries, as lower 
labour costs increase labour demand and labour intensity (Figure 7). The highest absolute 
increases are shown for Germany, the Netherlands,  Italy and the UK.  For EU-27  as a 
whole, employment will be almost 1 mill. higher than in the corresponding baseline BH in 
2020. It is also worthwhile to note, that the economic impacts of higher energy prices itself 
will be much higher (Ekins and Speck, 2010). 
Figure 5:  GDP in 2005 prices in selected countries: percentage deviations of scenario S2H 
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Figure 6:  GDP in 2005 prices in EU 27: percentage deviations of scenario S2H against 
baseline BH in 2020 
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Figure 8:  Energy related CO2 emissions in Mt: percentage deviations of scenario S2H 
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Figure 9:  Total primary energy supply in Mtoe: percentage deviations of scenario S2H 
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The scenarios are not designed to necessarily meet the EU renewables target of a 20% 
renewables share in final energy consumption in 2020. The share will increase from around 
10% today to above 14% even in the baseline with low energy prices as instruments such 
as feed in tariffs and biofuel quotas will continue. In scenario S1H the target will be missed 
with  around  18%  in  2020.  Only  in  scenarios  S2H,  S2HE  and  S2HI,  the  target  is  met 
(almost 20%).  
Energy-related carbon emissions are reduced in all EU countries against the baseline 
(Figure 8). The highest percentage reduction can be seen for many of the new member 
states with still high energy intensity and low energy prices. In these countries the relative 
price increase is higher than in countries like Germany or the UK with already high energy 
taxes and overall energy prices. 
Additional ETS revenues, material tax revenues and carbon taxes revenues from the 
industry sector are recycled back to industry via reductions in employers’ social security 
contributions (or wage subsidies in some countries). The revenues from the carbon tax on 
households (0.33% for Germany) are used for income tax reduction (Table 3). For EU-27 
overall revenues from ETS and ETR reach about 2% of GDP in 2020. These numbers are 
already  at  the  upper  end  of  different  calculations,  as  additional  EU  efforts  for  energy 
efficiency and renewable energy are not taken into account that will per se reduce the ETS 
price.  The  use  of  flexible  mechanisms  as  CDM  will  further  reduce  the  revenues  and 
earmarking of part of the revenues for mitigation and adaptation measures in emerging and 
developing countries limits the recycling into labour costs. 
The scenarios do not take the current economic crisis into account. According to the 
IEA (2009), the crisis will reduce carbon emissions also in the long run, which will lead to 
lower  carbon  prices  and  revenues  to  reach  fixed  targets  (or  make  tighter  targets  less 
costly).  
Table 3:  Additional revenues in % of GDP in 2020 
S2H DE UK EU-27
ETS revenues 0,83 0,64 0,59
carbon tax (industry) 0,52 0,44 0,54
carbon tax (households) 0,33 0,41 0,36
material tax 0,41 0,29 0,56
Sum 2,09 1,78 2,05  
The material or carbon taxes increase the prices of product groups according to their 
direct and indirect material and carbon content. The recycling mechanism reduces social 
security contributions and lowers labour costs again according to the direct and indirect 
labour content of sector output. The ETR reduces output prices in labour-intensive service 
sectors and increases prices in carbon- and material-intensive industry sectors.  
The  example  of  Germany  shows  for  the  trade-intensive  sectors  machinery  (15-17), 
motor vehicles (20) and other transport equipment (21-23) the effect being insignificant. 
Iron  and  steel  (12)  and  chemicals  without  pharmaceuticals  (8)  face  the  highest  price 
increases  of  trade-intensive  sectors.  As  the  German  iron  and  steel  industry  is  mainly 
delivering high quality steel to the German car industry and more and more to the German 
windmill  industry,  negative  competitiveness  impacts  will  be  limited.  Exchange  rate 
variations against non-EU competitors have been much higher in the past.   gws gws gws gws       Discussion Paper       2010/2 
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The  higher  prices  of  the  carbon-  and  material-intensive  products  will  reduce  price 
competitiveness on export markets and lead to some loss in the share of domestic markets 
to imports from other countries. This loss of price competitiveness, that has to be related to 
the assumptions about low market development of energy efficiency and RES technologies 
in other part of the world – i. e. it is partly by assumption -, will be offset by gains in the 
labour-intensive  sectors,  if  real  wage  costs  per  unit  of  output  have  fallen  in  the  ETR 
through  recycling  of  revenues  to  reduce  employers’  social  security  contributions.  Any 
improvement in non-price competitiveness will also raise exports. The extra employment 
will raise incomes, raising consumption and output. The overall impact on sector output 
depends on counterworking effects, which in sum are more negative for iron and steel and 
a few service sectors and positive for a few industry sectors. For most industries, the output 
effect is insignificant. The producers of fossil fuels have to reduce their production due to 
lower demand for their products, of course.   gws gws gws gws       Discussion Paper       2010/2 
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Employment impacts are positive for most sectors as labour productivity decreases and 
wage rates fall in relation to the consumer prices (CPI) and the output prices (Table 4). The 
relative costs of labour are lower than in the baseline without the ETR reform. Only around 
a quarter of the employment increase takes place in industry. 
Table 4:   Employment impacts of scenario S2H in Germany – deviations from baseline BH 
in 2020 
Employment in 2020 Deviation from BH Deviation from BH
in % absolute
Agriculture, forestry 2.4 9.0
Industry 0.9 65.3
Non-metallic minerals 2.4 6.2
Iron and steel -2.8 -3.7
Machinery and equipment 0.5 5.6
Electrical machinery 0.4 1.8
Construction 3.7 44.9
Trade and transport 1.0 82.9
Business services 1.7 76.7
Other services -0.2 -21.6
Total 0.7 250.6  
Concerning the wage rate, two countervailing effects have to be considered: When the 
labour market is characterised in terms of the “real wage bargaining” model, as in E3ME 
and GINFORS, with market power on both sides of the labour market, i.e. employers and 
trade unions, consumer price increases will lead to wage increases (the econometrically 
estimated factor is 0.85 for Germany). On the other hand, labour productivity is another 
important factor for the wage bargaining. The estimated elasticity for Germany is 0.63, i. e. 
a 1% increase of labour productivity leads to wage increases of 0.63%. Higher labour 
demand due to lower labour costs thus reduces the wage increase. In the end, the German   gws gws gws gws       Discussion Paper       2010/2 
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economy  is  more  labour-intensive  than  without  the  ETR,  partly  due  to  the  structural 
change towards labour-intensive industries.  
Additional  exports  in  scenarios  S2HE  mainly  create  new  jobs  in  machinery  and  in 
related business services (Table 5). A shift in the input structure of the utility sector leads 
to a shift in the industry structure and creates a few jobs in the service sector (Table 6). 
Table 5:   Employment impacts of scenario S2HE in Germany – deviations from scenario 
S2H in 2020 
Employment in 2020 Deviation from S2H Deviation from S2H
in % absolute
Agriculture, forestry -0,1 -0,2
Industry 0,3 19,4
Non-metallic minerals 0,2 0,5
Iron and steel 0,4 0,5
Machinery and equipment 1,3 13,0
Electrical machinery 2,4 11,7
Construction 0,1 1,8
Trade and transport 0,0 2,6
Business services 0,7 30,8
Other services 0,1 10,7
Total 0,2 63,4  
Table 6:   Employment impacts of scenario S2HI in Germany – deviations from scenario 
S2H in 2020 
Employment in 2020 Deviation from S2H Deviation from S2H
in % absolute
Agriculture, forestry -0,1 -0,2
Industry 0,0 0,0
Non-metallic minerals 2,5 6,5
Iron and steel -2,7 -3,6
Machinery and equipment 0,8 7,8
Electrical machinery 0,4 1,9
Construction 0,0 -0,4
Trade and transport 0,0 0,7
Business services 0,2 11,5
Other services 0,0 5,6
Total 0,0 16,7  
7  CO CLUSIO S 
The GINFORS model has been applied to assess economic and environmental impacts 
of ETS and ETR to reach the EU GHG targets in the EU in 2020. Results show positive 
employment effects and only small negative impacts on GDP. Economic impacts depend 
on the level of international energy prices, the recycling mechanism, country specifics such 
as carbon and energy intensity and structure of energy consumption.    gws gws gws gws       Discussion Paper       2010/2 
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Although  there  is  large  evidence,  that  eco-innovation  is positively  driven by  higher 
energy-prices, quantification is difficult. In two simulations possible impacts of a shift in 
the industry structure towards renewable energy in the electricity sector and an overall 
increase of EU exports due to higher global demand for renewable energy are modelled. 
The main results can be summarized as follows: 
An environmental tax reform, shifting taxes from labour to energy and resources will 
create additional jobs and trigger eco-innovation. Impacts of eco-innovation in the form of 
additional EU exports or shifts in industry structures will slightly increase GDP and create 
a  smaller  number  of  additional  jobs.  These  findings  correspond  to  results  from  the 
EmployRES study. As ETR is directly targeting labour costs, it will create additional jobs 
in the short and medium term. The impacts of eco-innovation in the form of cost reduction 
and new technologies will play a larger role in the longer term. 
ETR together with auctioning of ETS allowances can be a major source of revenues for 
EU countries in the future. But at least the share of revenues from carbon pricing will be 
limited.  Part  of  the  revenues  will  have  to  be  earmarked  for  adaptation  and  mitigation 
measures in developing countries. 
As each reform a major ETR in Europe will create winners and losers. On a sector level, 
carbon and material-intensive industries will have to face economic loss. On a country 
level,  carbon-intensity  but  also  the  overall  flexibility  of  economies  is  quite  important. 
International cooperation will reduce economic pressure on countries and sectors, although 
structural change away from the carbon-intensive industries, together with technological 
change, is inherent to any successful climate mitigation policy.  
ETR  and  ETS,  if  allowances  are  fully  auctioned,  are  additional  sources  of  public 
revenues. The discussion on grandfathering vs. auctioning of ETS allowances should be 
directed more towards this point. Countries, which give allowances away for free, will lack 
money to ease structural change and invest in low-carbon technologies.  
Results should be carefully related to the EU policy debate. In the model simulations the 
single carbon price is the only instrument to reach the EU 2020 GHG targets. Renewable 
energy and efficiency policies will also contribute to carbon reduction and have to be taken 
into  account,  when  comparing  the  results  (especially  the  high  carbon  prices)  to  other 
studies.  Both  reduce  the  potential  revenues  from  fossil  energy  carriers  and  carbon 
emissions. There are different renewable energy and efficiency policies that could further 
improve  the  economic  impacts  of  reaching  the  climate  and  energy  targets.  The  results 
clearly indicate to intensify the discussion on market-based instruments, but in the end a 
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